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Abstract. We argue that future database systems must provide autonomy for individuals for the privacy of data
they manage. We propose a design for such a system, identify challenges and problems, and suggest some
approaches to these. We enunciate the reasons for informational self-determination systems, which include
legal, organizational and technical issues. Our main goal is to achieve a widely-accepted realistic and practical
solution in order to ensure privacy for individuals in our future world, yet without hindering business and
security.
Key words: database management systems, informational self-determination systems, Privacy Enhancing
Technology (PET)
Privacy issues of privacy invasive technology
Identity-related technologies, location-based services
and ambient intelligence technologies certainly risk
the loss of anonymity and raise a number of privacy
concerns.
Identity management systems could play a critical
tool for the citizen, based on the growing number of
services. A unique access tool creates an electronic
witness of a major part of the citizens online life.
Furthermore these technologies have to comply with
the regulatory framework concerning privacy rights.
To manage and control these data is very diﬃcult,
especially if the entities are not from the same regu-
latory territory.
Biometric data are sensitive and of a personal
nature. Therefore even if it is forbidden by law, the
risk of being disclosed to a third party is high.
Numerous privacy concerns are raised within this
topic. Biometric data fully identify a person and
provide additional and sensitive information. Medi-
cal speciﬁcity can be found in ﬁngerprints, iris image,
and retina scan, for example. Iris scan and face rec-
ognition do not require contact therefore they are
more risky for privacy, because they can be diﬀused
or hidden in the local environment.
RFID tags can be accessed as well contact less
since they are also invisible. Therefore RFID tags
raise speciﬁc privacy concerns such as user awareness
and empowerment. RFID tags represent a sort of
identity management system, as soon as the tags are
linked to the owner of an object, thus deﬁning the
extent of privacy compromise.
In the near future, cellular system and WLAN
technologies will diﬀuse mobile broadband services.
Wireless communication increases privacy concerns
regarding personal data, traﬃc data and location
data. Negative consequences may arise for users
when databases are mined.
Location based services raise important privacy
questions. All citizens will have a shadow in the vir-
tual world. Physical location and movements will be
stored as personal, traﬃc and location data within
the virtual world. Diﬀerent parties are involved in the
value chain of a location based service, therefore
there is an even higher risk with regard to respecting
and protecting privacy rules.
Monitoring and surveillance capabilities, using
ambient intelligence, will emerge on a large scale.
Ethical reﬂection
As mentioned above, we are geared to the concept
of autonomy, which has become a key notion in
the Modern Era (since the 18th Century). In
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consequence, autonomy functions as a guiding prin-
ciple for ones action and as a normative idea to be
followed in social and technological evolution The
concept of autonomy thus serves as a standard for the
ethical evaluation of individual action and of tech-
nological development. Of course, the intellectual
content of it still needs clariﬁcation; yet it functions as
an ethical authority with its critical, its directive and
constructive, in short with its challenging potential.
Thus the concept of autonomy is a true representative
of modern consciousness, which insists on the
humans responsibility of their moral and legal
rights, as well as on the respect for possible self-
determination.
Autonomy as self-determination
In todays interdisciplinary discussion of autonomy,
the second element of what we just mentioned takes
the lead, i.e. self-determination in a moral, political,
and legal sense. Here the autonomy principle calls for
the respect of a persons private sphere as well as of
its external sphere of action, as far as it depends on
the persons will. So far, the autonomy principle is a
defensive principle; it is meant to regulate external
actions, limitations, also in the form of networks,
infringements, yet also co-operation, as experienced
by the individual human being. Thus the concerned
persons right of self-determination must not be lim-
ited without good reason, nor against his or her will.
However, it is not possible to derive from the
autonomy principle – fundamental as it may be – any
clear instruction for or any precise evaluation of a
speciﬁc action. For this requires the immediate con-
frontation with the factual context. And yet, accept-
ing autonomy as a human potential and a justiﬁed
claim entails clear consequences. I. Kant has based
his concept of autonomy on the conviction that
normative obligation presupposes the rational sub-
jects pledge to universalized norms he or she has
formulated him- or herself. He thus laid the ground
for our claim to self-determination and the ensuing
personal responsibility. We may realize and conserve
them both, but only as far as we succeed in control-
ling, refusing, accepting, or modifying external
inﬂuences (heteronomy) on parts or the whole of our
personal identity.
Informational self-determination
With regard to the so-called ‘‘informational self-
determination’’, we may say that the principle of
autonomy entails the right of monitoring the condi-
tions under which personalized information is
acquired and used (ALLEA 2002). This is admittedly
a general, yet still a substantial principle, which needs
a circumspect political and legal – and not in the
least, technical – concretization. It goes without
saying that the current trend will lead to more per-
sonal data being generated and used to an ever
greater extent. As a result, there will be a greater risk
to ‘‘informational self-determination’’.
This problem must be addressed, because all parts
of our society are morally and legally concerned when
it comes to guaranteeing and protecting ‘‘informa-
tional self-determination’’. This is a target value that
must not be lost sight of and one that must be
articulated repeatedly, particularly when this target
value becomes just one element in a process of
weighing goods and of due consideration. The
autonomous informational self-determination is not
an absolute value; it may lose some of is weight in the
light of higher and well founded interests (e.g. in
criminal prosecutions). In view of certain interests
that sometimes compete with each other, such as
among individual rights and protection, and public
concerns, this principle must be appropriately
implemented; especially when considering the conse-
quences of disclosing personal data. This applies to
the rules derived directly from the principle of
informational self-determination (Privacy and the
National Information Structure 1995).
Basic rules
(a) As a matter of principle, an individual should
have the right to decide upon the conditions of the
generation and use of his/her own relevant per-
sonal data; directly following from which, that
any personal information resulting from this
particular data is collected, disclosed, and made
use of so as to be fully respect the individuals
data protection. This concerns ‘‘Informational
Privacy’’. The extent of this ‘‘Informational Pri-
vacy’’ protection should be deﬁned and guaran-
teed through the best possible means. In most
cases, this may be achieved when the concerned
parties and the users of the particular information
reach an agreement on exactly how the personal
information should be disclosed and used. To
reach this goal, it is indispensable that the society
guarantees a determined fundamental level of
data protection rules – with appropriate sanc-
tions, in the event of misuse.
(b) When personal Information is stored, the con-
cerned individual may rightfully claim that the
respective information is correct, current, and
complete in relation to the purpose for which it is
intended and used. Therefore, the data must
exhibit that it is of reliable quality (Principle of
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Quality). Furthermore, the users of personal data
must in principle furnish information on why such
information have been collected, what they are
used for and what measures have been taken in
order to guarantee the conﬁdentiality and the
quality of the particular information (Enlighten-
ment Principle or Notice Principle). This principle
serves to guarantee that the individuals infor-
mation is suﬃcient (and presented in a compre-
hensible manner) so as to allow him or her to give
his or her informed consent (Principle of In-
formed Consent).
(c) Users of the particular information must under-
take appropriate technical and organizational
measures in order to guarantee the conﬁdentiality
and quality (Protection Principle) of personal
related data. If such data are processed in a net-
work-type environment, they are under high risk
with regard to a third partys unauthorized access,
unauthorized transmission, unauthorized modiﬁ-
cation of data, etc. Appropriate protection
requires a discriminating, diversiﬁed, and a con-
tinuously veriﬁed strategy.
(d) The ‘‘Principle of Fairness’’ states that those who
are accruing advantages based on their rights are
not to be doing so as to the disadvantage of others
(J. Rawls). In the context of ‘‘Informational Self-
Determination’’, this means that personal infor-
mation is not to be used in opposition to the
concerned individuals expectations on how these
data should be – with the exception of well justi-
ﬁed public interests permitting such use. In this
respect, ‘‘fairness’’ means that the users of the
particular information have to accept the expec-
tation as developed from the concerned individ-
uals point of view, in order to determine to which
extent the data may be used. The goal consists in
guaranteeing that those who are concerned and
the data users achieve a balanced understanding
on what shall be the adequate precautionary
measures for suitable, speciﬁc use of personal
related data that should be taken.
Security and privacy
Balancing security and privacy in the information
society will be a tough task. Respecting somebodys
private life has to be weighed up against issues of
national security, public safety, economic wellbeing,
prevention of disorder and crime, protection of
health and rights and freedom of others (Maghiros
et al. 2003, Walters 2001). It is impossible to make a
prediction as to which side the future will lie on, but
the risk of losing privacy, the ‘‘right to be let alone’’,
‘‘the right to select what personal information about
me is known to what people’’, in the information
society is rather high (Westin 1967; Warren and
Brandeis 1890).
From our point of view, citizens will lose their
entire privacy if nothing is done against current
developments. To strengthen privacy and security,
actions on legal, organizational and technical issues
are required (Lessig 1999). These three elements are
included in our approach to privacy-enhanced data-
base systems which we explain in Sections ‘‘The
concept of privacy revisited’’ and ‘‘Founding princi-
ples for informational self-determination database
systems’’.
State-of-the-art privacy enhancing technology
The term Privacy Enhancing Technology (PET)
originated in the mid-nineties from a study that
investigated technological measures to curb the use of
identifying data in information systems (Registra-
tiekamer 1995). Nowadays the term PET is widely
used, and refers to technologies which aim to elimi-
nate the use of personal data in information systems
or to restore the users control over the revelation of
personal data (Burkert 1997). In a wider sense, one
could say that the term PET represents all technolo-
gies which pertain to protecting an individuals
privacy.
Many privacy enhancing technologies aim to allow
anonymous transactions and anonymous communi-
cation in the Internet. While this is clearly the most
eﬀective approach to avoid the creation of personal
data, it remains to be seen whether service providers
are willing to embrace these technologies. The
approach of enterprise-level privacy policies promises
to guarantee that enterprises do indeed process data
according to their declared policy. However none of
the technologies we know oﬀer a combination of legal
and technical means to restore users control over
personal data. New approaches need to be found that
let users regain control of personal data stored in a
multitude of databases.
The concept of privacy revisited
More than 100 years ago, Warren and Brandeis
wrote the landmark paper ‘‘The Right to Privacy’’,
published in the Harvard Law Review in 1890
(Warren and Brandeis 1890). They deﬁned privacy as
‘‘the right to be let alone’’ and argued that legislation
should give this right to every individual: ‘‘Political,
social, and economic changes entail the recognition
of new rights.’’ (Warren and Brandeis 1890) In
the twentieth century, many legal scholars and
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philosophers have attempted to deﬁne the concept of
privacy (Gormley and Brandeis 1992). However, it is
impossible to come up with a universally valid deﬁ-
nition of privacy as the concept depends on social
aspects, cultural values and the legal framework. The
issues of privacy are ‘‘fundamentally matters of val-
ues, interests and power’’ (Gellmann 1998, p. 194).
An implication of privacy as an interest is that it
has to be balanced against other competing interests.
Peoples interest in their own privacy may conﬂict
with the interests of other people or organizations
(Etzioni 1999). The concept of privacy does not apply
to information only. Privacy rights have a long
tradition and are implemented in many ﬁelds
(Rosenberg 1992):
– Territorial privacy: Protects the physical surround-
ings of a person, i.e. in a domestic or other
environment.
– Bodily privacy: Protects the physical integrity of a
person against undue interference (e.g. physical
searches, DNA testing).
– Communication privacy: Protects the personal
communication of a person against monitoring
by other people or organizations.
– Informational privacy: The right of a person to
control what data about him or her can be
gathered, processed and disseminated.
In the context of information systems, privacy has
naturally been deﬁned as informational privacy. This
restriction makes sense as an information system
usually does not aﬀect territorial or bodily privacy
(with the exception of robotics applications or some
ubiquitous computing devices, which are outside the
scope of this paper).
A very common and well-accepted deﬁnition of
informational privacy is the one given by Alan
Westin in his classical work on privacy. Westin
deﬁnes informational privacy as ‘‘[t]he claim of indi-
viduals, groups and institutions to determine for
themselves when, how and to what extent informa-
tion about them is communicated to others’’ (Westin
1967).
At the heart of the notion of informational privacy
lies the understanding that certain information about
a person is not public but rather private, however it is
not possible to give a precise deﬁnition as to which
data fall into which category. Such a notion depends
on cultural understanding and personal views.
Informational privacy is, just like other forms of
privacy, the interest of an individual that may com-
pete with the interests of other parties.
With the widespread use of information systems,
the understanding of privacy shifts towards an
interpretation of privacy as the right to informational
self-determination. An individual should have the
right to control the release and dissemination of
personal data as well as the context the data are going
to be used in, to the greatest possible extent. In
addition to Alan Westins deﬁnition of informational
privacy, we state that in general informational pri-
vacy and the measures to protect it should address:
– the release and dissemination of personal data
(purpose),
– the right to remain unidentiﬁed (anonymous) when
we choose to,
– the protection of highly sensitive data in electronic
systems,
– the latent danger of tracking and logging of users
and their activities,
– the right to be let alone,
– the right to live without the threat of constant
surveillance by electronic means.
We claim that the advent of new technologies poses a
threat to the citizens privacy. The fact that comput-
ers are becoming ubiquitous – and that information
technology is becoming more and more a part of our
daily lives – leads to an erosion of informational
privacy. An awareness of privacy problems must
therefore be created urgently. We maintain that any
technology able to enhance privacy is thus worth
discussing. We see our paper as a contribution to the
discussion on privacy issues and aim to point out new
directions in which technology and legal frameworks
may be developed in order to work towards oﬀsetting
the negative eﬀects that information technology has
on privacy. The next section further motivates the
principles of participation and transparency. Trans-
parency and participation are considered in the con-
text of the data protection tradition. Both are
discussed in the context of private as well as public
sector data processing. We consider how these two
principles are implemented by our architecture and
explain why the architecture leads to more transpar-
ency and better participation as compared to most of
todays data processing systems.
Transparency and participation in privacy legislation
When the interest in informational privacy began to
increase due to the widespread use of information
technology, legislative bodies began addressing the
problem in the 1970s. The ﬁrst modern data protec-
tion act was adopted by the German State of Hessen,
the ﬁrst national law by Sweden in 1974. A very
inﬂuential piece of data protection legislation is the
US Privacy Act. The act was passed by the Congress
in 1974, thereby acknowledging that the rapid
development of information systems posed a threat to
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personal privacy. Although the Data Protection Act
was not very successful in the US, it found much
attention abroad. This resulted in the fact that many
elements of this policy can be found in data protec-
tion laws of other countries.
The US Privacy Act was crafted after the work of
an advisory committee, which had established
the notion of ‘‘fair informational practices’’. These
practices are based on work by Alan Westin and
turned out to be very inﬂuential in shaping data
protection legislation around the world. Westin sta-
ted eight important principles for fair information
processing (Westin 1967). These principles have been
also incorporated into the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development guideline on
data protection of 1980 (OECD 1980) and the EU
directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals
with regard to the processing of personal data (The
European Parliament 1995).
One of those principles is the principle of openness
and transparency. It states that there should be a
general policy of openness guiding collections of
personal data. Especially, there should not exist any
secret data collections. Means of establishing the
existence and nature of collections, the main purposes
of their use as well as the identity of the data
controller should generally be known. Another
important principle is the principle of individual
participation: Individuals should have the right to
request information from a controller as to whether a
collection contains data about them. Requests should
be answered within a reasonable period of time and
at a reasonable price. Furthermore, individuals
should have the right to have records rectiﬁed, com-
pleted or erased where appropriate (i.e. in the case of
incorrect or illegally stored data).
Transparency and participation in e-commerce
data processing
Various surveys have shown that privacy is a sub-
stantial concern on the Internet, particularly in
e-commerce transactions (Ackerman et al. 1999).
Users are obliged to divulge personal data in almost
every transaction, and in so doing, leave traces each
time such a transaction is carried out. In most busi-
ness relationships, users have neither insight into
what data the other party collects nor do they have
access to these data.
For e-commerce purposes, P3P is slowly gaining
popularity. This standard, however, only addresses
privacy declarations. The use of P3P does not lead to
any form of participation or to a much enhanced
transparency. There are very few companies who
allow users to see their personal data and to control
how this data is to be used. An approach such as
EPAL is therefore a step in the right direction. The
use of EPAL guarantees that data are processed in
accordance with speciﬁed polices. Our approach
speciﬁcally aims at heightening transparency and
participation in data processing. We thus conclude
that in the domain of e-commerce, participation and
transparency in data collections are the exception
rather than the rule. An approach such as the one
presented in this paper can help to make data col-
lections more transparent and to give users more
participative power. We shall propose that portals
should be operated which give individuals access to
the audit data (see Section ‘‘Participation’’) that is
stored about them and thus increase both transpar-
ency and participation.
Transparency in e-government data processing
Informational privacy is an especially important issue
in e-government. The data that are processed in
e-government environments are often of a much more
sensitive nature than the data processed in the
domain of electronic business (Joshi et al. 2002).
People are increasingly concerned about privacy
issues related to e-government, and tend to feel the
same way about citizen cards (BBC News 2003).
Although information and communication technol-
ogy provide notable opportunities for reshaping the
relationship between government and stakeholders
and for creating more eﬃciency in bureaucratic sys-
tems, it also creates signiﬁcant security and privacy
challenges. Data in governmental databases contain
highly sensitive data such as social security numbers,
information related to individual taxation, data
concerning religious beliefs, criminal records, demo-
graphic information and medical records. Further-
more, governmental bodies process high volumes of
data. They are empowered by public law to collect
data on citizens and can enforce their right to do so.
Governments thus have the potential to accumulate
large data collections, which may create potential
conﬂicts with the citizens interest in informational
privacy (Schweizer and Burkert 1996). Given these
facts, it is even more desirable that citizens know
what data governmental administration keeps about
them.
Administrative cultures and procedures in Europe
vary, and so do the views on the sensitivity of data.
Religious aﬃliation is considered a very sensitive
issue in the Netherlands and in Greece, while inhab-
itants of Finland are very sensitive about data that
relates to the gender of a person. Many other exam-
ples can be found illustrating the diﬀerences that exist
with regard to the sensitivity of data.
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We feel that there is still a general lack of trans-
parency and participation in governmental data col-
lections. In most European countries, citizens do not
have the right to access their own data in govern-
mental data collections. An exception is Sweden: All
data that is collected by the state is deemed public. As
a consequence, any citizen has the right to see e.g. his
neighbors tax declaration. Another fairly advanced
country (with regard to participation) is the Nether-
lands: Here it is currently being discussed if citizens
should have access to their own data in all govern-
mental data collections. Yet in most European
countries citizens do not automatically get access to
their own public records.
Conclusion
With the widespread use of information systems, the
focus on privacy shifts towards an understanding of
privacy as the right to informational self-determina-
tion. An individual should have the right to control
the collection, the release and dissemination of per-
sonal data as well as the context in which the data is
going to be used, to the greatest possible extent.
Founding principles for informational
self-determination database systems
Privacy enhancement can be understood as an
increase in the control each customer has regarding
personal data which is shared with organizations. In
this section, we introduce our concept for privacy
enhancement and point out the key principles on
which our system design is based.
Our founding principles are motivated by our
ethical reﬂection described in Section ‘‘Ethical
reﬂection’’. These principles are rooted in existing
data protection laws. They articulate what it means
for a personal data collection system to responsibly
manage private information. We argue for the fol-
lowing six newly interpreted principles that should
complement the several privacy regulations which
already exist. Indeed some of the principles are rela-
ted but not similar to Westin and Agrawal (Westin
1967; Agrawal et al. 2002).
Consent: People know when their personal data
are stored and have to give their consent prior to
storage.
Purpose: People aﬀected must have the possibility
to specify the purpose and usage of their data.
Separation: Personal data have to be stored sepa-
rately from business data.
Audit: Transactions involving personal data must
be recorded in transactional logs. Persons aﬀected
can then follow executed transactions and retrace
usage of their personal data.
Participation: People aﬀected have access to their
personal data, its usage and purpose speciﬁcation.
They can choose if, when and how to manage their
personal data.
Ease of use: People aﬀected have the choice to
bundle access to personal and audit data through
portals and can deﬁne automatically applied patterns.
In comparison with Westin and Agrawal, princi-
ples such as ‘‘limited collection’’, ‘‘limited use’’ and
‘‘limited retention’’ are not requested within our
approach, however each individual is free applying
his own set of principles. Within our approach, the
‘‘consent’’ principle is enforced by law and is strictly
connected to the ‘‘purpose speciﬁcation’’ principle,
which is supported by technology. This infrastructure
is expanded in such a way that each individual knows
all his or her data sources. This makes principles like
‘‘limited retention’’, ‘‘openness’’ and ‘‘compliance’’
traceable, so that mistreatments of the data-
protection law can be investigated. Principles such as
‘‘accuracy’’ or ‘‘safety’’ are essential requirements
and, as such, will not be mentioned again.
Consent
Nowadays almost any transaction is recorded. As
long as no exact identiﬁcation of a speciﬁc person
can be made by using these data, no privacy issues
are involved and there is no need for us to care
about it. As soon as these data are linked to
personal data, however, privacy could be jeopar-
dized as described in Section‘‘Privacy issues of
privacy invasive technology’’.
The ﬁrst principle is that people, whose private
data are stored, must give their consent for this
storage, and the speciﬁed organization is obliged to
inform these individuals ‘‘where and what’’ data are
stored. In most cases, people do not remember
which companies store their data; they often don
not have any possibility to know this because in
many cases they are completely unaware of such a
data collection.
Personal data can be used for evaluations and for
marketing purposes. It may be sold to other compa-
nies without the customers consent or knowledge,
and such data could even be stolen. Generally people
do not pay attention to who manages or what hap-
pens with their data, but as soon as they are harassed
with spam, telemarketing calls or advertising mails
they want to know how this problem has arisen. On
the other hand, it is important that organizations are
not able to refuse services to any individual on the
grounds of a possible risk. Excluding customers from
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setting up a life insurance policy, denying access to
buildings or generally concealing information are just
a few examples of this. The importance of giving
customers more information about data storage and
the necessity of the customers consent for further
usage of that data is evident. At the same time,
organizations gain competitiveness while data man-
agement transparency is oﬀered to customers.
Purpose
The ﬁrst principle illustrates the importance of cus-
tomers being informed as to where and what personal
data is stored. We outline why it is important to
specify the purpose as to how personal data can be
used.
Personal data can be used for diﬀerent purposes
and it is often used against peoples intentions. This
data-misuse problem can be solved if organizations
put the people aﬀected in a position from which
they can inﬂuence further data management. Each
organization deﬁnes its own purposes which deter-
mine the intended use of personal data. Individuals
are then able to decide how these settings should be
applied to their personal data. For example, a pur-
pose speciﬁcation may be to receive special oﬀers by
e-mail. Organizations can distinguish themselves
from competitors and at the same time enhance
trust and conﬁdence in their services. This method
of participation naturally varies from organization
to organization. The only exceptions when peoples
personal data is passed on without their consent are
deﬁned by legal regulations or occur during criminal
investigations.
Separation
An area urgently requiring more attention with
respect to privacy and security is the stage at which
business data is separated from personal data. During
such a separation, business data, which contains
sensitive information (e.g. about executed transac-
tions), can be used for data mining without any need
for the persons consent. Only an identiﬁer indicates
that these data belong to a speciﬁc person, so the data
are anonymous as long as no connection to personal
data can be made. As soon as personal data are
requested for a speciﬁc purpose by linking to these
data, this process must be permitted by the person
aﬀected and subsequently, recorded in the audit trail.
Audit
Both people and organizations must have the possi-
bility to understand and detect unauthorized uses of
personal data. This leads us to the need for audit
information where all executed transactions which
accessed personal data can be traced. Such informa-
tion should contain all of the following: Who had,
when and with which purpose, access to what kind of
personal data? This knowledge provides more secu-
rity to individuals and organizations. This audit
information simultaneously supports data protection
and helps to minimize fraud. Usually, these data are
stored on the organizational side, but should be
readily accessible to the persons aﬀected.
Participation
While discussing the principles above, we saw why it
is so important for people to manage and control the
usage of their data. On the one hand, customers must
be informed about further utilization of personal
data, and on the other hand, they must be able to give
their consent for any usage purpose.
To fulﬁll these requirements, customers need
access to personal data being stored on the organi-
zational side. This participation can be realized in
diﬀerent ways, e.g. by telephone, forms or internet.
Ease of use
A possibility of accessing personal data is realized via
web portals. The central idea is to aggregate the
information shared with all the organizations we are
dealing with, and to create one personal portal. This
provides people with a better overview and ensures
that organizations know where users are managing
their data and that they are informed of any changes.
The resulting beneﬁt for organizations is improved
customer contact, enhanced trustworthiness and a
higher level of conﬁdence.
This kind of information aggregation results in a
possible security gap. Each person can minimize this
problem by depositing their personal data on diﬀer-
ent web portals. Each portal is physically separated,
certiﬁcated and protected by a password.
This solution encompasses good standards, open
interfaces and the possibility for organizations to buy
these systems out of the box, its main objective being
to enhance the ease of use by oﬀering standardized
interfaces and by always adhering to the security
requirements.
Design
In this section, we discuss the design aspect. We study
a scenario and illustrate the idea of purpose speciﬁ-
cation with the help of two examples. Furthermore,
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we outline the structure to indicate the direction in
which the set-up of such databases could be preceded.
However, it is not a full implementation guide.
A use scenario
Avantara and Belios are two on-line booksellers who
want to enhance customers conﬁdence in their com-
pany by implementing an autonomic database sys-
tem. The main idea is to provide a service giving
customers the possibility to deﬁne what happens after
personal data is entrusted to their companies. Basi-
cally, customers set purposes for their personal data
usage. During the process in which business data is
separated from a customers personal data, these
anonymous business data can be used for data min-
ing and data analysis. References from business to
personal data always need a customers consent.
Additionally, customers are able to see and verify
all executed transactions in a transactional list (audit
trail), which is automatically updated each time the
personal data is accessed.
In this section, we look at examples revealing how
the two booksellers handle this requirement and what
purpose speciﬁcations they deﬁne.
Purpose speciﬁcation Belios
Avantara and Belios must observe legal regulations
and inform customers about these exceptions. For
example, in the case of criminal investigations, per-
sonal data may be handed over to public agencies
without the customers consent. Avantara and Belios
have diﬀerent opinions about how much information
and customers cooperation is necessary. Belios
deﬁnes only a few settings (see Figure 1) for purpose
speciﬁcations of personal data, and only asks general
questions, for example, if the customer would like to
receive advertisements.
Purpose speciﬁcation Avantara
Avantara, on the other hand, gives customers various
possibilities to deﬁne purpose speciﬁcations regarding
the use of their personal information. For instance,
Avantara assumes that customers have preferences as
to which information should come via which channel.
Hence, Avantara oﬀers various channels for com-
munication and makes distinctions between private
and business phone numbers. Furthermore, custom-
ers can classify how they prefer to be contacted. These
options are contracted under the tab ‘‘Contact’’.
Under ‘‘Order’’, general order properties are deﬁned,
such as whether or not customers wish to be informed
about their order status. Other companies and indi-
viduals are also employed to perform functions on
Avantaras behalf. Examples include fulﬁlling orders
and delivering packages, sending postal mail and
e-mails, etc. They require access to personal infor-
mation which is necessary in order to perform their
functions, but they are not permitted to use it for any
other purpose. Avantara guarantees that business or
personal data is never passed on to third parties
without the customers prior consent, and that
customers are always asked if data may be used for
purposes other than those deﬁned at the beginning.
For customers who do not want to answer each single
question under the ‘‘Defaults’’ tab, Avantara deﬁnes
settings-categories for data usage. The data usage
allowance can be set on ‘‘Minimum’’ or ‘‘Maximum’’.
Last but not least, Avantara gives customers the
chance to deﬁne the intensity of advertisement. These
predeﬁnitions are visualized in Figure 2.
Alice and Bob are looking for a skilled online
bookseller, whereby Avantara and Belios are short-
listed. Alice is a privacy fundamentalist who normally
doesnt want companies to retain any information
once her purchase transaction is complete. However,
she is willing to commit her personal data in order to
receive some speciﬁc information if she can be certain
that her data will be handled conﬁdentially and only
for the chosen purposes. For this reason, Alice deci-
des to buy her books at Avantara since there she has
the best overview of her personal data usage. Bob, in
contrast, is a privacy pragmatist. He appreciates the
convenience of only having to provide his e-mail and
postal address once when registering with organiza-
tions. He likes to receive new recommendations, but
does not want to be part of purchase circles. He also
chooses Avantara but his reasons are diﬀerent from
Figure 1. Privacy control settings for customers of Belios.
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Alices. The diﬀerent ‘‘Privacy Control Settings’’ of
Alice and Bob are illustrated in Figure 2. (compare
also Agrawal et al. 2002). Trent is Avantaras privacy
oﬃcer. He is responsible that the information sys-
tem complies with the companys privacy policies.
Mallory is an employee and he has questionable
ethics.
Architecture
Finally, we present the architecture of an autonomic
database. Central to the design is the active partici-
pation of customers in providing speciﬁc information
within the organizational systems (compare Figure 3).
Components
Customer Data Requestor is responsible for opening
a communication channel to the Request Handling
Agent, which is located on the Customers Data
System side.
Request Handling Agent only accepts properly
formulated requests from the correspondingCustomer
Data Requestor.
Privacy Settings Rule Model covers rules which
determine for which purposes customers personal
data can be accessed. These rules are constituted in
the Privacy Control Settings. Trent designs these
privacy deﬁnitions with regards to the companys
privacy policy. For instance, he determines the pur-
poses as to when a customers e-mail address can be
used.
Rule Compliance Validator examines whether or
not a personal data request complies with the Privacy
Control Settings of each user.
Access Control takes care of accesses before and
during query execution. Access Control is carried out
on both the Business and Personal Data Identiﬁca-
tion System.
Query Intrusion Detection checks the accuracy of
accesses after the queries by comparing the access
with the usual access patterns for queries with that
purpose and by that user. For example, Mallory
decides to steal all e-mail addresses of Avantaras
registered users and to sell them to Avantaras com-
petitors. Normally, customers e-mail addresses can
only be accessed for sending them recommendations
or oﬀers, or to enable order status tracking etc., as
deﬁned in the Privacy Settings Rule Model. Before
the query results are returned, the Query Intrusion
Detection matches these queries with the usual access
patterns and detects the fraud.
Audit Trail records all possible queries for privacy
audits and addresses challenges regarding compli-
ance. Furthermore, this is where the customers
Figure 2. Privacy control settings of Alice and privacy control settings of Bob.
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personal preferences as well as any changes to the
Privacy Control Settings are maintained. Since
customers have access to audit information, they are
in a position to view all transactions and to detect any
fraud.
Privacy policy
Figure 4 illustrates the separation of customers per-
sonal and business data. The privacy policies of the
two systems therefore diﬀer in certain aspects, as
explained in the following section.
Figure 3. Architecture: collaboration model.
Figure 4. Security interface – positioning.
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Authorized users and applications of the Business
Data System are speciﬁed in the privacy policy. These
are the set of Avantaras employees and applications
who, or respectively which, can access particular
information. The anonymous business data is acces-
sible for purposes such as data maintenance, data
mining and data analysis. As a result of the data
separation, Avantara does not require a customers
personal information for most data mining and
analysis activities – that is, not until Avantara
addresses its customers directly.
The privacy policy for the Personal Data Identiﬁ-
cation System is more sophisticated and consists of
three main parts.
Authorized users are a group of employees, cus-
tomers and applications. Employees and applications
access this data for maintenance purposes only.
Customers, in comparison, access the Privacy Con-
trol Settings to assign their preferences and restric-
tions with regard to data usage. Moreover, customers
access Audit Trail information to view and verify the
suitability of the use of their personal data. Returning
to our example case, Mallory is employed by
Avantara to maintain customers business data,
therefore he has no authorization to access custom-
ers personal data.
Rule Mechanism Privacy rules are deﬁned in the
Privacy Settings Rule Model. This model covers rules
which determine the general purposes for which
customers personal data can be accessed. The Rule
Compliance Validator checks customers Privacy
Control Settings to examine if speciﬁc accesses should
be allowed.
Request/Reply Mechanism: The only way of con-
necting anonymous business data to customers per-
sonal data is via a communication channel between
the Customer Data Requestor and the Request
Handling Agent. The Customer Data Requestor asks
for information from the Request Handling Agent,
which handles these requests and sends back a reply
veriﬁed by the rule mechanism.
Queries
Avantara decides to launch a new marketing pro-
motion, and therefore selects 500 records from the
Business Data, with the intention of sending these
customers speciﬁc recommendations by post or by
e-mail. In order to do so, Avantara needs to access
the Personal Data Identiﬁcation System where
customers addresses are stored. The access from the
Business Data System to the Customers Data System
is only possible via a controlled channel. All queries
for customers personal data are ﬁrst sent to the
Customer Data Requestor. The Customer Data
Requestor forwards these queries to the Request
Handling Agent, which is located in the Personal
Data Identiﬁcation System (see Figure 4).
The Request Handling Agent passes on all prop-
erly formulated queries it receives to the Rule Com-
pliance Validator. The query for customers postal or
e-mail addresses with the purpose ‘‘recommendation’’
was sent by an authorized employee at Avantara. The
Rule Compliance Validator now checks, in accor-
dance with the Privacy Settings Rule Model, if this
query can be accepted. After this commitment, cus-
tomers Privacy Control Settings are checked. Alice
stipulated in her Privacy Control Settings that she
doesnt want to receive any recommendation whilst
Bob would like to be sent recommendations by
e-mail. Therefore only Bobs e-mail address is sent
back to the Customer Data Requestor.
Lets suppose that Alice unexpectedly receives a
recommendation from Avantara, despite having told
them that she doesnt want this. Since Alice has access
to the Audit Info where all transactions are recorded,
she can verify the permission of the received e-mail
and complain to Avantara about the mistreatment of
her personal data (compare Figure 5).
New challenges
Now we describe some interesting problems which we
identiﬁed in our principles and design. This list is by
no means complete; its purpose is to initiate discus-
sions. We use intentionally the same structure as in
Section ‘‘Founding principles for informational self-
determination database systems’’ to visualize the
connection.
Consent
The cornerstone for informational self-determination
database systems would be a new international data
protection law requesting the explicit consent of a
person before personal data can be stored. Further-
more, the law stipulates that this person must have
access to their data, to specify purposes and to con-
trol audit information.
Within this law, several questions are raised. There
will be a certain amount of administrative work and
it will not always be clear how to set up the process.
For instance, the user must ﬁrst give his/her consent,
before his/her personal data is stored, and not the
other way around. How can organizations which do
not care about this law be identiﬁed? Are normal
individuals qualiﬁed to handle their personal data?
Should one instruct a company specialized for this
purpose?
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However – and this is a crucial point – at least one
person knows which databases store information
about him/her.
Purpose
At a ﬁrst glance, purpose speciﬁcation may appear
easy. However selecting what kind of usage from
personal data a person allows depends heavily on the
way in which this can be achieved and on how these
usages can be presented and categorized. No one is
willing to spend several minutes specifying purposes;
therefore, a low amount of ﬁxed categorizations has
to be deﬁned in which each category includes several
purpose speciﬁcations. Then, people can choose to
make settings either only on the category level and/or
for each purpose. The categorization must also be
independent of the branch or industry. To set-up,
deﬁne and become widely accepted, such a general
categorization of purposes is essential and its devel-
opment may be a tough task.
Separation
Business data and personal data are often already
separated in large-sized companies. Diﬀerent appli-
cations use these data. On the other hand, in small and
middle-sized companies these data are normally stored
together and are only used by one main application. A
physical or logical separation is necessary according to
the principle of separation. This makes any IT-archi-
tecturemore complicated. In addition, the architecture
has to be extended with a strong identiﬁcation func-
tionality. To increase trust and conﬁdentiality, the
‘‘Personal Data Identiﬁcation System’’ (see Figure 4)
should be certiﬁed by a third party.
Audit
Generating audit trails that are in the hands of the
people aﬀected could provide a strong and powerful
tool for protecting privacy. First of all, these audit
trails can be investigated by the organizations them-
selves in order to detect internal misuse. Secondly,
each person can scan these data and convince him-
self/herself in compliance with the audit trail of his/
her personal data, or in the case of misuse, can place
a complaint. Last but not least, a person can engage
external software agents to monitor his/her audit
information so that he/she can be automatically
informed if a violation is detected. Within this sce-
nario, three main questions arise. How can an indi-
vidual set up his/her complaint and who will receive
this message? What kind of competence or interest
could such a ‘‘compliance oﬃce’’ persecute? What
kind of consequences may occur for the principal
oﬀender? Furthermore, ‘‘Rule Compliance Valida-
tor’’ agents activated by the customer represent sev-
eral security and privacy risks, despite being
convenient for the customer.
Figure 5. Flowchart: privacy security interface.
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Participation
Participation requests a certain kind of connection to
the control equipment of the purpose speciﬁcation
and audit information. This communication and
requested identiﬁcation must be secure. Misuse
cannot be tolerated.
Ease of use
We propose a hybrid solution. Each person can
decide how centralized he/she would like to treat his/
her personal data. A centralized system is quicker and
easier to handle but encompasses more privacy risks
than a decentralized system; however they could both
provide a higher level of security. A centralized sys-
tem is a far more attractive target for illegal trans-
actions, because full data proﬁles related to speciﬁc
users are available. The systems structure should at
least be digitally secured against possible misuse and
should guarantee the respect of a citizens privacy.
Closing remarks
Organizations collect large amounts of personal data
about their customers. Even though they promise
privacy to their customers by means of privacy
statements, there is no methodology to enforce these
promises throughout and across multiple organiza-
tions. This paper illustrates the way in which the
informational self-determination database systems
can be achieved; it also deﬁnes legal and organiza-
tional principles as well as technical privacy-enabled
database management systems for increasing per-
sonal privacy. Inspired by Kant, we present a vision
of a system that minds the privacy of the data which
it manages. Its comprehensive privacy-speciﬁc
approach expresses how individuals regain control
over their own personal data. From a users point of
view, this will tend towards the end of heteronomic
database systems. Our approach oﬀers a realistic,
practical and pragmatic solution for enhancing indi-
vidual privacy, without hindering business, organi-
zations and national security doing their job.
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